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ABSTRACT Researchers from academia and the corporate-sector rely on scholarly digital libraries to
access articles. Attackers take advantage of innocent users who consider the articles’ files safe and thus
open PDF-files with little concern. In addition, researchers consider scholarly libraries a reliable, trusted,
and untainted corpus of papers. For these reasons, scholarly digital libraries are an attractive-target and
inadvertently support the proliferation of cyber-attacks launched via malicious PDF-files. In this study,
we present related vulnerabilities and malware distribution approaches that exploit the vulnerabilities of
scholarly digital libraries.We evaluated over two-million scholarly papers in the CiteSeerX library and found
the library to be contaminated with a surprisingly large number (0.3-2%) of malicious PDF documents (over
55% were crawled from the IPs of US-universities). We developed a two layered detection framework aimed
at enhancing the detection of malicious PDF documents, Sec-Lib, which offers a security solution for large
digital libraries. Sec-Lib includes a deterministic layer for detecting known malware, and a machine learning
based layer for detecting unknown malware. Our evaluation showed that scholarly digital libraries can detect
96.9% of malware with Sec-Lib, while minimizing the number of PDF-files requiring labeling, and thus
reducing the manual inspection efforts of security-experts by 98%.
INDEX TERMS Scholarly, digital, library, paper, PDF documents, malware, malicious documents, distri-
bution.
I. INTRODUCTION
The number of scholarly documents (English language)
accessible on theWeb is enormous, estimated at over 114mil-
lion PDF documents [5], of which over 27 million (∼24%)
can be easily accessed without payment or subscription [5];
since then, the estimated number of scholarly documents
on the Web raised significantly. These documents are freely
available in part because researchers publish draft versions of
their papers on their professional home pages (often within
the domains of universities), before the final versions are
published by the publishers.
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Luis Javier Garcia Villalba.
Researchers also publish their research on their home
pages to increase exposure, reach researchers around
the world, and gain citations and recognition for their
work [6], [7]. In order to assist researchers, many scholarly
digital libraries and search engines collect and index the
author’s version. Thus, the papers can be easily downloaded
worldwide. This free collection of scholarly documents is a
valuable resource for most researchers and academics who
may not have a comprehensive subscription to all publishers’
content.
Figure 1 presents a snapshot of search results for a
searched paper using Google Scholar. At the bottom of the
page, one can access all 15 versions of the paper, already
indexed by Google Scholar, simply by clicking on the blue
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FIGURE 1. Google Scholar’s search results for a given academic paper,
including 14 additional versions of the paper.
FIGURE 2. Some of the additional versions of the searched paper,
including those available for free.
‘‘All 8 versions’’ link; in this way, free and convenient ver-
sions are literally at the user’s fingertips, as seen in Figure 2.
Note that there are several versions from different sources
(e.g., psu.edu, uni-tuebingen.de, semanticscholar.org).
Researchers heavily use scholarly digital libraries to
access and download scholarly documents [33]. For exam-
ple, according to a survey by EBLIDA,1 there are a total
of 5,974 academic libraries in Europe; however, this number
is far from complete given that it is based on information
provided by only 25 countries participating in the survey.
Nevertheless, the number of registered users of these libraries
is 39,328,294. As Europe represents only part of the world’s
research activity, the global usage of scholarly digital libraries
is much higher.
Universities are considered to be highly reputable insti-
tutions that primarily focus on research, the goal of which
is to contribute new and valuable knowledge to the world.
Therefore, they are considered a trusted content source with
no malicious intent. Correspondingly, the websites of their
academics and researchers (which often reside on the insti-
tution’s network domain) are also thought to contain only
trusted content, free of malicious PDF documents. In a cir-
cular fashion, academic digital libraries tend to harvest these
allegedly trusted sites without hesitation or fear, and do not
1http://www.eblida.org/activities/kic/academic-libraries-statistics.html
even scan them to detect malicious content.2 In addition,
their reputation as sources of trusted scholarly documents
makes digital libraries an attractive platform from which
to take advantage of and distribute malicious PDF docu-
ments. Attackers are aware of this chain of trust and use
social engineering techniques in which they take advantage
of the heavy use and blind trust of researchers in schol-
arly digital libraries and the papers (PDF documents) they
download from them; once one researcher within an orga-
nization is infected, it can quickly become a major cyber
security incident for the entire organization’s computational
system [32]. Researchers’ Web pages have become a target
that can be used to launch attacks.3 In addition, researchers,
professors, and research students are naturally attractive can-
didates for attack, because, due to the nature of their work,
they have access to confidential and sensitive information,
such as nuclear knowledge, medical records, aviation, and
educational records and materials (e.g., student data, exams,
etc.). Moreover, some researchers collaborate with govern-
mental agencies and industry, which allows them access
to national and confidential information from governments
(such as computational criminology), national institutions,
and companies’ intellectual property, while other researchers
collaborate with healthcare institutions and hospitals, and are
connected to their networks and computerized systems [34].
Previous studies have presented many methods of improv-
ing the detection of malicious PDF documents [1], [2]. These
studies focused on detection techniques based on analyzing
the malicious PDF documents when they have already been
downloaded to the host machine. To the best of our knowl-
edge, no study has addressed the issue at an earlier stage,
before downloading, a stage at which it might be possible
to prevent malicious PDF documents from being mass dis-
tributed through legitimate channels and exiting platforms,
and thus, markedly improve the detection of malicious PDF
documents, including those found on popular, well-known,
and extensively used sources of PDF documents, such as
scholarly digital libraries. These libraries can be intentionally
used as a free and very successful platform for distribut-
ing PDF malware quickly and easily to a desired group of
victims with access to valuable information. An academic
paper arouses little suspicion, particularly if an attacker wants
to distribute a new zero-day attack quickly in the shape
of a benign PDF document. Zero-day attacks4 utilizes new
attack techniques or new vulnerabilities5 that are difficult to
detect, particularly by the anti-virus tools commonly used
by organizations such as universities and academic digital
libraries for scanning PDF documents. Thus, these libraries
can easily be used as a new and convenient platform for
2According to the CiteSeerX team, some of whom are authors of this
paper.
3http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/17/education/barrage-of-
cyberattacks-challenges-campus-culture.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
4http://www.bullguard.com/bullguard-security-center/pc-
security/computer-threats/what-are-zero-day-attacks.aspx
5http://www.pctools.com/security-news/zero-day-vulnerability/
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distributing zero-day attacks. One should take into consid-
eration that these libraries are a very dynamic environment
in which a large number of papers are added daily; thus,
even advanced detection solutions for PDF malware based on
machine learning algorithms [1] will lose their generalization
capabilities regarding the detection of unknown PDF mal-
ware, since both for benign and malicious PDF documents
the data and patterns concealed in them change rapidly and
often. Consequently, an efficient and frequent update process
is required in order to maintain and improve the detection
of PDF malware in light of the daily additions of new PDF
documents into these scholarly digital libraries.
Smutz and Stavrou [52] suggested a variant of the query
by committee [55] method to improve the detection of PDF
classifier. Their method included mutual agreement analysis
which was found effective at identifying specific samples to
be added to the training set, resulting in significant improve-
ment in the classifier’s performance compare to when random
sampling method was used. However, this method requires
maintaining an ensemble of different classifiers, a require-
ment that can be dismissed by usingmethods of another active
learning approach that enables the use of only one classifier.
Keeping pace with newly created documents was demon-
strated in recent years by Nissim et al. [11], [15], [20],
using active learning (AL) methods [38], which have been
integrated and used in the solution we present in this study.
The contributions of our paper are fourfold:
1) We are the first to demonstrate the vulnerability of large
public databases such as scholarly digital libraries,
as well as the first to present several simple approaches
and techniques that can be used to compromise these
libraries and utilize them for malicious purposes.
2) We are the first to reveal the malicious use of scholarly
digital libraries and also the first to estimate the extent
of this phenomenon. Using current anti-viruses, after
indexingwewere able to assess which papers contained
malware. To support our findings and emphasize the
severity of the phenomenon, we also performed further
analysis one year after our initial evaluation of papers
that were collected by the CiteSeerX digital library over
a period of eight years.
(3) We are the first to investigate very large databases,
such as scholarly digital libraries that are traditionally
thought to be secure and harmless, and showed how
they can be maliciously used as a platform for malware
distribution and leveraged for targeted cyber security
attacks. We also evaluated the impact of the presence
of malicious documents in a scholarly digital library.
(4) In this study we also present and implement Sec-Lib,
a comprehensive and adaptive detection framework
aimed at enhancing the security of very large databases
such as scholarly digital libraries. Sec-Lib encom-
passes both deterministic and advanced machine learn-
ing approaches (e.g., active learning for updating based
on the frequent changes in these libraries) in order
to provide a comprehensive solution for the detection
of malicious papers (PDF malware) in scholarly dig-
ital libraries. While the machine learning approaches
used in Sec-Lib are based on our previous work [11],
we have extended and improved our original approach,
by adding deterministic detection layers to Sec-Lib and
rigorously and empirically evaluating Sec-Lib, using
real data originating from a scholarly digital library
and demonstrating that it can substantially reduce the
number of malicious PDFs included in these libraries.
II. BACKGROUND
As indicated previously, theWeb contains more than 114 mil-
lion scholarly documents [5], and this number represents
a significant attack surface for adversaries who want to
take advantage of the fact that scholarly digital libraries are
considered trusted and their content (PDF documents) is
downloaded by many users worldwide. In order to grasp
the potential harm that can be caused by the presence of
malicious PDF documents in a scholarly digital library,
we briefly describe targeted attacks conducted via schol-
arly digital libraries using malicious PDF documents. Then,
we present the possible attacks that can be launched by a
malicious PDF document mistakenly considered a benign
scholarly document, and the techniques used to achieve this.
In so doing, we aim to raise the awareness of scholarly
digital libraries, as well as innocent researchers and readers,
regarding the power of a malicious PDF document, so that
they will increase their vigilance against such attacks and
employ the best security means possible.
A. TARGETED ATTACKS VIA SCHOLARLY DIGITAL
LIBRARIES USING MALICIOUS PDF DOCUMENTS
Sophisticated attackers interested in sensitive and novel
knowledge about a specific domain, such as nuclear energy,
can launch a targeted attack by inserting an attractive, yet
malicious, paper that addresses nuclear energy into digital
libraries, engaging and tempting researchers to download the
paper. It is noteworthy that the attacker does not need to be a
co-author of the paper. Our investigation showed that most
scholarly digital libraries (such as Google Scholar) crawl
academic websites and index the papers they find, disregard-
ing any mismatches between the author’s affiliation and the
website that stores the paper. Thus, an attacker can take a
popular paper written by someone else, inject malicious code
into it, and upload it to several websites. When the victim
opens the malicious PDF document, a malicious code will be
executed in the victim’s computer. This malicious code may
allow the attacker to exfiltrate data from the victim’s machine
and send it to a remote server controlled by the attacker.
This type of attack is within the realm of reality, for the pre-
viously mentioned reasons, and also because users consider
non-executable files safer than executables, and thus are less
suspicious of PDF documents, especially when downloaded
from popular and trusted scholarly sources. Unfortunately,
non-executable files such as PDF documents are as dan-
gerous as executable files, since their readers can contain
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vulnerabilities that, when exploited, can allow an attacker to
execute malicious actions on the victim’s computer. Syman-
tec’s Internet Security Threat Report (ISTR6) 2016 indicates
that malicious PDF documents are used for targeted attacks,
especially via malicious emails. Note that since that time,
the number of targeted attacks on Adobe Reader has almost
doubled. In the following section, we elaborate on several of
the most common techniques and attacks involving the use of
malicious PDF documents.
B. POSSIBLE ATTACK TECHNIQUES USING
PDF DOCUMENTS
Before explaining how scholarly digital libraries can be easily
used as a platform to leverage and distribute attacks world-
wide, we present some of the many ways PDF documents
can be used maliciously when created or manipulated by an
attacker.
1) JAVASCRIPT CODE
PDF documents may contain embedded JavaScript code or
code retrieved from URIs [22], including 3D content, form
validation, and mathematical calculations. Typically, a mali-
cious JavaScript code in a PDF document attempts to exploit
a vulnerability in the PDF viewer in order to divert the nor-
mal execution flow to the embedded malicious code. This is
achieved by a heap spraying7 attack. JavaScript also allows
the download of an executable file that may contain malicious
content. Alternatively, JavaScript code can access websites,
whether malicious or benign.
2) CODE OBFUSCATION AND FILTERS
Code obfuscation is used legitimately to prevent reverse engi-
neering of proprietary applications. However, it can also be
used by attackers to hide malicious content. Filters are used
in PDFs to compress data for encoding and reducing file
size, and are frequently used by attackers to conceal mali-
cious content. Available filters and their primary purposes are
discussed by Baccas and Kittilsen [23], [24].
3) EMBEDDED FILES
APDF document can contain other file types, such as HTML,
JavaScript, SWF, XLSX, EXE, or even another PDF docu-
ment, which can be used to embed malicious files that are
frequently obfuscated. When special techniques are applied,
the embedded file can be opened without alerting the user.
Maiorca et al. [25] presented a novel evasion technique
called ‘‘reverse mimicry,’’ which was designed to evade state-
of-the-art malicious PDF detectors based on their logical
structure8 [21]. Mimicry attacks inject malicious content
into a benign PDF while maintaining its benign structure.
6https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/reports/istr-21-
2016-en.pdf
7Heap Spraying - A technique used in exploits to assist random code
execution.
8PDF logical structure is a hierarchy of structural elements, each repre-
sented by a dictionary (see the PDF file structure section).
This method can be automated easily and does not require
knowledge of the structural features used in themaliciousness
detector.
4) FORM SUBMISSION AND URI ATTACKS
Hamon [4] presented practical techniques that can be used by
attackers to execute malicious code from a PDF document.
The author showed that security mechanisms, such as the
Protected Mode of Adobe Reader X or the URL Security
Zone Manager of Internet Explorer, can easily be disabled by
changing the corresponding registry key. Moreover, a URI9
address can be used (instead of a URL), directing the user to
any type of file located remotely, including executables.
It should be noted that Adobe Reader version X, released
in 2011, included a new sandbox isolated environment,
Protected Mode Adobe Reader (PMAR), that ensures that
malicious code operations cannot affect the operating system.
Nevertheless, most organizations (including universities) do
not keep up with the newest versions of PDF readers, and
thus, are exposed to many of the well-known attacks.
C. ANALYZING VULNERABILITIES OF POPULAR
SCHOLARLY DIGITAL LIBRARIES
Now, we briefly present the most popular libraries, their
market share, and their uniqueness, and then explain the
vulnerabilities that exist within them. In addition, we present
new vulnerabilities that we utilized to demonstrate potential
attacks. We present three libraries in which we found a vul-
nerability.
1) GOOGLE SCHOLAR
Google Scholar10 is a free public Web search engine for
scholarly literature. It indexes nearly 100 million scholarly
documents and is considered the largest scholarly digital
library, encompassing 87% of the total number of the existing
scholarly documents [5]. Current articles are indexed and
can be found when searched. A user clicking on an article
that appears on the results page of Google Scholar is usually
directed to the article’s Web page on the publisher’s official
website. In addition to articles on the publisher’s website,
other versions of the papers, from other places on the Web
are also indexed (e.g., papers from a researcher’s Web page
on an academic institution’s website).
In order to demonstrate contamination of a digital library
such as Google Scholar, we used theWeb page of a researcher
at a known university (details are not provided for privacy
reasons). The articles on the researcher’s Web page were
indexed byGoogle Scholar previously and can be accessed by
clicking the ‘‘All X versions’’ link under the relevant article
in Google Scholar, as shown in Figure 1. With no connection
to the researchers’ names appearing in Figure 1, in our
case, after we had obtained the permission of the researcher
9URI – ‘‘a compact string of characters for identifying an abstract or
physical resource,’’ RFC2396. A URI is an extension of a URL, used for
identifying any Web resource (not limited to Web pages).
10https://scholar.google.co.il/
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mentioned above, we downloaded the most popular paper
(a PDF document) from his web page and injected amalicious
JavaScript into it using a PDF editing program called PDF-
Fill11 (such that the malicious JavaScript code is launched
when the new article’s file is opened). Then, we replaced
the benign paper with this new malicious version of the
paper on the researcher’s website. Now, the malicious paper
is available for downloading through Google Scholar using
the original indexing information that was neither changed
nor updated in light of the replacement of the paper behind
the published URL. The vulnerability in Google Scholar lies
in the indexing mechanism, which checks only the title and
author’s name and pays no attention to whether a new file was
uploaded with the same title and author’s name.
As far as we could determine, Google Scholar does not
verify that the uploaded paper is related to the researcher’s
home page. Thus, a malicious PDF document that carries
the same title and authors of a popular paper can easily be
created and placed on other Web pages unconnected to a
researcher’s home page within a university. These malicious
papers can easily be promoted with an acceptable payment
to Google for a promoted link. In this way, the attacker
uses several elements of existing tools and services to launch
his/her attack. First, the attacker takes advantage of the pop-
ularity of a particular paper, second he/she uses the fact that
Google Scholar is a trusted source of information, and third
the attacker exploits a vulnerability in the Google Scholar
indexing mechanism. Consequently, the attacker achieves
his/her attack goals by redirecting the download traffic to the
malicious version of the paper.
2) CiteSeerX
CiteSeerX12 is a growing scientific literature digital library
and search engine that focuses primarily on literature in the
areas of computer and information science. It is unique in that
it collects papers solely from researchers’ home pages from
the domains of universities and physically stores the papers
themselves and creates links to the papers. The result is that
the library contains over four million academic papers in PDF
format, and its total size is estimated at about 3.8 terabyte.
According to the way in which CiteSeerX collects aca-
demic documents, we identified several methods by which
a malicious PDF paper could be indexed and stored by a
popular digital library. A malicious paper could be uploaded
to a researcher’s website directly. This can happen uninten-
tionally if the paper was infected by a malware resident on
the researcher’s computer before it was placed on the website.
Alternatively, the paper could be contaminated using a free,
malicious PDF creator that injects malicious code into the
edited papers. Another likely scenario is that the researcher’s
page could be hacked, with the attacker replacing a benign
paper with a malicious one. In each of these examples, a mali-
cious paper finds its way to the researcher’s home page within
11http://www.pdfill.com/
12http://csxstatic.ist.psu.edu/about
an academic institution’s trusted domain, making it available
for uploading by CiteSeerX, as well as to the general public
worldwide.
3) SOCIAL NETWORK BASED SCHOLARLY DIGITAL
LIBRARIES
ResearchGate13 (founded in 2008) is a social networking site
for scientists and researchers, enabling them to share papers,
communicate, and find collaborators. Today, it has more than
six million members. ResearchGate is also considered an
academic digital library as its members can upload and share
papers with other members.
Academia.edu14 (launched in September 2008) is a
platform for academics for sharing research papers, moni-
toring their impact, and following researchers in a partic-
ular field. Over 63 million academics have signed up to
Academia.edu, adding ∼21 million papers. Academia.edu
attracts over 19 million unique visitors a month.
ResearchGate and Academia.edu are examples of schol-
arly academic digital libraries affiliated with social networks
for researchers whose purpose it is to share data, papers, and
knowledge with other researchers.
To utilize scholarly digital libraries for malware distribu-
tion, an attacker can create a fictitious profile of a famous
researcher through Academia.edu. The attacker can then
upload several of the researcher’s well-known papers in order
to boost the profile’s credibility and gain the trust of col-
leagues. After several weeks, when the profile is active and
papers have been downloaded from the profile, the attacker
can easily upload a malicious version of the same papers
in order to perform an attack. A malicious PDF document
(a non-zero-day malicious PDF document) that should be
recognized by an anti-virus tool will not be rejected when
uploaded, since such scholarly digital libraries have limited
security mechanisms. In this way, social relationships and
trust can be used in order to leverage to a social network-
based library for the distribution of a PDF malware.
4) ADDITIONAL EXISTING SCHOLARLY DIGITAL LIBRARIES
The following are additional existing scholarly digital
libraries that we have not yet checked for vulnerabilities;
however, we assume that vulnerabilities exist and should be
further investigated.
Microsoft Academic Search15 (MAS) is a free public Web
search engine for academic papers and literature, developed
by Microsoft Research for the purpose of algorithm research
on object-level vertical search, data mining, entity linking,
and data visualization. Microsoft Academic Search consists
of almost 50 million scholarly documents and is considered
one of the top alternatives to Google Scholar [5].
13http://www.researchgate.net/
14https://www.academia.edu/
15http://academic.research.microsoft.com/
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Web of Science16 is an online subscription-based scientific
citation indexing service maintained by Thomson Reuters
that provides comprehensive citation search. It consists of
nearly 50 million scholarly documents and is, along with
MAS, among the largest academic digital libraries after
Google Scholar [5]. One should note that Web of Science
does not index the PDF documents, as Google Scholar does.
PubMed17 is a free search engine that primarily accesses
the MEDLINE database of references and abstracts on life
sciences and biomedical topics. The United States National
Library ofMedicine at the National Institutes of Health main-
tains the database as part of the Entrez system of information
retrieval. PubMed comprises over 24 million citations of
biomedical literature from MEDLINE, life science journals,
and online books. Citations may include links to full-text
content from PubMed Central and publishers’ websites.
arXiv is an automated electronic repository and distri-
bution server for research articles, consisting of electronic
preprints of scientific papers in the fields of mathematics,
physics, astronomy, computer science, quantitative biology,
statistics, and finance, which can be accessed online. Almost
all scientific papers within arXiv are self-archived, meaning
that theywere uploaded by the users themselves. Table 1 sum-
marizes some interesting details about the scholarly digital
librariesmentioned in this section, as well some libraries from
the Darknet.
TABLE 1. Summary of Scholarly digital libraries’ details regarding to their
crawling, indexing and redirecting approaches to the scholarly
documents.
The largest libraries, Google Scholar, MAS, and Web of
Science, do not rely on papers uploaded by users as they
collect (crawl) papers from the publishers and do not store
them. Note that there are several closed grouped libraries
within the Darknet, such as Libgen, Sci-hub and Booksc,
and we assume that specifically in these closed libraries
the probability and percentage of malicious papers is higher
than in the known and wide-open libraries. This assumption
should be scrutinized in future research.
16https://apps.webofknowledge.com/
17http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed
III. SCANNING CiteSeerX FOR PDF MALWARE
As part of this collaborative study with the CiteSeerX team,
we scanned and analyzed the CiteSeerX digital library as our
dataset. Our goal was to determine whether this platform had
already been used, either intentionally by an attacker or unin-
tentionally by an innocent researcher, to distribute malicious
PDF documents, and in so doing, to measure the extent of
harm that can be caused by such a scenario. When we began
scanning, the CiteSeerX library contained 4,044,118 aca-
demic papers in PDF file format that were collected until
the time this study began. The papers originated from more
than 188 countries and most continents and were written by
1.3 million different authors from 4,963 universities.
We used the VirusTotal18 service to scan the entire
CiteSeerX library for malicious PDF documents. VirusTotal,
a subsidiary of Google, is a free online service that provides
comprehensive analysis of files and websites (URLs) by a set
of ∼63 anti-virus engines and website scanners. VirusTotal
allows a user to submit suspicious files for analysis. After
the analysis, VirusTotal provides a report that lists suspicious
files identified by each of the anti-virus engines. Note that
we considered a PDF document malicious, if at least five
different anti-viruses identified it as a malicious file.
A. SCANNING RESULTS OF CiteSeerX IN 2015
In this section we present the results and provide an analysis
of the results regarding the process of scanning of the PDF
documents within the CiteSeerX library. We provide an anal-
ysis of aspects of both crawling and downloading the mali-
cious papers, on the basis of a worldwide breakdown. Some
of these scanning results were presented in our preliminary
paper published recently [19], however in the current workwe
explain it more comprehensively, and also present our novel
detection methodology, Sec-Lib, and its evaluation in terms
of the detection of PDF malware in scholarly digital libraries.
1) CRAWLED MALICIOUS PAPERS
Of the 4,044,118 PDF files that were submitted for analysis
from the CiteSeerX library, only 2,586,820 were actually
scanned by VirusTotal due to our license and network band-
width limitations. Of these files, 753 (∼0.3%) were found
and classified as malicious by VirusTotal’s anti-virus engines.
Figure 3 presents the breakdown of the threats identified.
The threat categories were provided by the identifying
anti-virus engine. As can be seen in Figure 3, 72% of the
malicious files were identified a vulnerability exploitation.19
Usually, a vulnerability in the PDF document format is
exploited utilizing an embedded JavaScript code.20 9.5% of
the malicious files were classified as a Trojan, a malicious
program that when executed performs covert actions that have
not been permitted by the user. 7.5% of the malicious files
18https://www.virustotal.com/
19http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/exploit
20http://blogs.technet.com/b/mmpc/archive/2013/04/29/the-rise-in-the-
exploitation-of-old-pdf-vulnerabilities.aspx
VOLUME 7, 2019 110055
N. Nissim et al.: Sec-Lib: Protecting Scholarly Digital Libraries From Infected Papers Using Active Machine Learning Framework
FIGURE 3. Breakdown of the threats identified among the 753 malicious
PDF documents found by VirusTotal on the CiteSeerX library.
contained JavaScript code that was recognized as malicious.
JavaScript code can be identified as malicious although it
does not exploit any vulnerability and is consideredmalicious
when the code signature is known to represent a malicious
code. 3.9% of the malicious files were classified as malware,
which means that malicious software (e.g., Exe, PDF, etc.)
was found embedded in them. 3.4% of the malicious files
contained a threat (Adware,21 Trojan, or Riskware22) tar-
geting the Android operating system widely used on mobile
devices. 1.9% of the malicious files contained a computer
worm,23 which is a malicious program that can propa-
gate by autonomously copying itself from one machine to
another. A small percentage of files (1.1%) were classified as
Spyware,24 which is a malicious computer program aimed at
collecting personal information from the victim’s computer.
Although it does not damage the victim’s computer, it can
cause damage to the victim by stealing sensitive informa-
tion. Adware is a program aimed at supporting advertising
and operates without the user’s permission. An additional
5,775 files were identified as malicious by the Fortinet
anti-virus, because they contained a suspicious threat called
‘‘HTML/Redirector.BK!tr.’’ These files might be malicious,
since they may direct the user to malicious destinations such
as websites, IP addresses, and servers. Deeper analysis is
required to reach a final decision; however, in case these
files would be found to be malicious, and the percentage
of malicious PDF documents in the CiteSeerX library will
increase from 0.3% to 2%, this situation will emphasizes the
phenomenon of scholarly digital library contamination we
describe in this paper.
21http://www.pctools.com/security-news/what-is-adware-and-spyware/
22http://usa.kaspersky.com/internet-security-center/threats/riskware
23http://www.pctools.com/security-news/what-is-a-computer-worm/
24http://www.microsoft.com/security/pc-security/spyware-whatis.aspx
FIGURE 4. Distribution of the malicious scholarly documents based on
the geographical location from which they were crawled by CiteSeerX
scholarly digital library.
Figure 4 presents the distribution of the malicious schol-
arly documents according to the geographical location from
which they were crawled by the CiteSeerX scholarly digital
library. More than 55% of the malicious papers in CiteSeerX
were crawled from IP’s belonging to US universities, whereas
about 33% were crawled from IP’s belonging to European
universities. Asia includes several countries, e.g., China,
Russia, and Korea, which on the one hand are known to have
a large population of researchers and on the other have been
found to be the origin of many malware samples. Because of
this, we were surprised to find that only 5.9% of the mali-
cious papers were crawled from IP’s belonging to an Asian
institution; we did not find any malicious papers crawled
from Russia or Korea which are the origin of a great deal of
malicious content, especially malicious Android applications
found in application markets [10].
In Table 2, we can see the top 11 European countries in
terms of the percentage of malicious scholarly documents
crawled from researcher’s homepages and websites associ-
ated with IP addresses belonging to these countries. While
Germanywas found to be the origin of 10.7% of themalicious
TABLE 2. Breakdown of the distribution of the malicious scholarly
documents based on the geographical location from which they were
crawled by CiteSeerX scholarly digital library (of the entire world’s
malicious papers).
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papers in CiteSeerX among all of the countries around the
world, it is the origin of more than 31% of the malicious
papers in CiteSeerX among all European countries. It was
followed by the United Kingdom (6.04%), Holland (2.74%),
and France (2.61%). The other European countries not men-
tioned here were the origin of less than 0.41% of malicious
scholarly documents of the entire world’s malicious papers in
CiteSeerX.
2) DOWNLOADED MALICIOUS PAPERS
We now present the impact and power of an attack stemming
frommalicious papers published in a scholarly digital library.
Using CiteSeerX’s database and its website’s historic log
files, we extracted and aggregated information regarding the
download data of the malicious papers we found. We faced
a ‘big data’ problem due to the enormous amount of data we
needed to extract and process, and therefore, we extracted the
downloading information for only the top 31malicious papers
identified by a large number of anti-virus engines out of the
total 723malicious papers that were found.We focused on the
download statistics for the five preceding years, and there-
fore, we can provide conclusions regarding relevant down-
load trends. In addition, we also used GNUParallel25 to boost
the speed and reduce the very long running time. The data
comprised 5197 successful downloads of malicious papers
(during 2009-2014) which resulted from just 31 malicious
papers crawled byCiteSeerX’s, meaning that scholarly digital
libraries have had an average ‘damage coefficient’ of167 in
the last five years.
Note that the papers are downloaded based on the inter-
est they create among readers in the scientific community,
regardless of how malicious and dangerous they are. There-
fore, the number of times papers are downloaded is not
dependent on their level of maliciousness. Thus, the papers
that were identified as malicious are in fact randomly selected
in terms of the number of downloads; consequently, this
number is not affected when other (more malicious or less
malicious)randomly selected papers are chosen @perioBy
calculating the damage coefficient, our goal was to present
the damage rate for the most dangerous papers and emphasize
the importance of the phenomenon of scholarly digital library
contamination with malicious papers.
The average number of different countries that downloaded
malicious papers was 16, covering all of the continents
(except for Antarctica), which constitutes extremely wide
coverage of the world’s research population within univer-
sities and other institutions. Table 3 presents information
regarding the top 20 most downloaded malicious papers
(from CiteSeerX) during the last five years. The most down-
loaded malicious paper is on the topic of computer forensics
and apparently was a malicious version of a very popular
paper; it was downloaded 2213 times in 108 different coun-
tries on all continents (except for Antarctica). The popular
25http://www.gnu.org/software/parallel/
TABLE 3. Top 20 most downloaded malicious scholarly documents during
the last five years, their country of origin, and the number of countries in
which they were downloaded.
topics among malicious papers were related to computers,
such as cyber security and computer science.
Figure 5 presents the distribution of the malicious schol-
arly documents according to the geographical location from
which they were downloaded from CiteSeerX scholarly dig-
ital libraries. More than 40% of the malicious papers in
CiteSeerX were downloaded from US IPs, whereas about
28% were downloaded from Asian IPs.
FIGURE 5. Distribution of the malicious scholarly documents according to
the geographical location from which they were downloaded from
CiteSeerX scholarly digital library.
Figure 4 shows that the US was the origin of more than
55% of themalicious papers in CiteSeerX. The data presented
in Figure 5 and Table 4 indicates that the US was also the
most popular destination of malicious papers and the location
of more than 40% of the downloads of malicious papers, fol-
lowed by India (9.52%), China (5.04%), and the UK (3.77%).
As can be seen, using a scholarly digital library as a platform,
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TABLE 4. Top countries downloading most of the malicious scholarly
documents from CiteSeerX during the last five years.
an attacker can easily distribute a worldwide attack through a
malicious scholarly document.
IV. Sec-Lib: A FRAMEWORK FOR MALWARE DETECTION
IN SCHOLARLY DIGITAL LIBRARIES
After our discovery of malicious PDF documents in the
CiteSeerX scholarly digital library, we informed CiteSeerX
team about the malicious PDF documents, as well as the
potential harm that could be caused by not attending to this
problem. We also shared our ideas and practical solutions
regarding how to address the issue with CiteSeerX. These
ideas and solutions presented in this paper were used to
develop the Sec-Lib framework. Sec-Lib is a comprehen-
sive detection system aimed at enhancing the security of
very large databases, such as scholarly digital libraries. Such
databases share characteristics, including: 1) being frequently
updated with many new files (e.g. PDF documents) on a
daily basis, 2) being affected by external factors, such as the
discovery of new vulnerabilities and attack techniques that
can be exploited via the hosting program of such files (e.g.
Adobe reader), and 3) containing new malicious versions of
papers that already exist within the database. Sec-Lib inte-
grates two security layers in order to enhance the detection of
malicious PDF documents within scholarly digital libraries.
The first layer includes a set of deterministic and rule based
detection solutions aimed at the detection of 1) known mal-
ware, 2) known vulnerabilities, and 3) incompatibility of PDF
documents. The second layer consists of several advanced
machine learning based methods for the efficient detection of
unknownmalicious PDF documents, as well as improving the
detection capabilities of the framework on a frequent basis.
Figure 6 demonstrates the Sec-Lib framework and its two
layers. The dynamic database consists of the existing papers
in the digital library as well as the new papers which are
published daily and collected from the Web according to
the library’s policy. This policy might include collecting
FIGURE 6. Sec-Lib framework.
papers from authors’ official websites, open access journals,
forums, etc. Then, in step {A} all of these PDF documents
are inspected in the deterministic first layer which is partic-
ularly aimed at the detection of known PDF malware and its
variants, and includes:
• A compatibility check of PDF documents to ensure that
they can be properly opened by users before they are
made available to library users. (96.5% of malicious
PDF documents are incompatible).
• Filtering by the backward check module which filters all
of the known malicious PDF documents using an anti-
virus signature repository.
• An additional review of each new PDF vulnerability-
exploitation identified.
Note that we don’t apply the machine learning based layer
(second layer) directly on all of the PDF documents for
the following reasons. 1) Before implementing the machine
learning algorithms, we execute anti-virus software, thereby
allowing the anti-virus software to detect as many known
malicious files as possible (based on its existing signatures)
in the first deterministic layer. It is well-known that machine
learning algorithms have had great success in detecting new
variants of malware, as well as in assisting in the crafting of
signatures for malware. Despite this success, their false pos-
itive and false negative rates are typically higher than those
of anti-virus software (especially in light of the increased
use of adversarial machine learning approaches [55]). Since
a system like Sec-Lib is expected to cope with an enormous
number of new PDF files on daily basis, Sec-Lib should be
efficient and employ a multilayer process; therefore, we use
the anti-virus in the first layer and employ the machine
learning based detector in the next layer on the remaining
files (those files that the anti-virus software couldn’t detect
as malicious due to its limited detection capabilities).
2) There is no reason to use machine learning solutions
on incompatible files, both malicious and benign, as these
incompatible files are not openable, and thus, will not be
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transferred to the user. These two modules manage to filter
out (in advance) all of the files that don’t require classification
by a machine learning algorithm, while focusing the machine
learning-based layer on the remaining more hard to detect
files. Since scholarly digital libraries consist of millions of
files, a practical solution must be efficient and only focus
its efforts on files that cannot be handled by the other deter-
ministic components. Therefore, machine learning solutions
are aimed at compatible and unknown PDF documents, both
malicious and benign.
Once step {A} is completed, we are left with compatible
PDF documents which might contain new unknown PDF
malware. These files undergo deep inspection in step {B}
(in the second layer) which features a machine learning based
approach aimed at new unknown malware detection and
includes two advanced components:
• A detector that is based on machine learning techniques
and aimed at malicious PDF document detection, which
efficiently leverages the statically extracted properties of
the structural hierarchies in the PDF documents.
• An active learning-based module and methodology for
frequent and efficient update of both the detector and
anti-virus tools with new informative PDF documents,
especially new malicious ones.
We now elaborate on each of the components in the deter-
ministic first layer:
A. COMPATIBILITY CHECK OF PDF DOCUMENTS
In our previous works [2], [11] we observed that many mali-
cious files are not compatible with the PDF document format
specifications according to the Adobe PDF Reference26 and
cannot, in fact, be opened by the PDF reader and viewed
by the user. When the user tries to open an incompatible
file (malicious or benign), the PDF reader is not able to
open it and provides an error message. If it is a malicious
PDF document, the malicious operation is executed; if it is
a benign file, nothing occurs. However, in both cases the
file remains unopened and cannot be viewed by an innocent
user. Thus, it is clear that there is no reason to deliver an
incompatible file to the user, and this observation should be
taken into account in academic digital libraries, which can
easily identify such files andmark them as suspicious, or even
block them from being published before they are ever opened
by an innocent user. Incompatibilities of PDF documents are
originated in cases which the crafted PDF documents do not
meet the PDF document format specifications according to
the Adobe PDF Reference. One example of incompatibility
of PDF documents can be observed at the end of the file in
the line between ‘‘startxref’’ and ‘‘%%EOF’’ lines. This line
should contain a number serving as a reference (offset) to
where the last cross reference table section is located in the
file. In cases of incompatibility, the number that appears is
incorrect. This incompatibility and many others can be easily
26http://www.adobe.com/content/dam/Adobe/en/devnet/acrobat/pdfs/
pdf_reference_1-7.pdf
determine using simple check of the PDF document content
in light of the known specifications.
B. BACKWARD CHECK USING ANTI-VIRUS TOOLS
One of the vulnerabilities we found in academic digital
libraries (particularly Google Scholar) relies on the fact that
once a new paper is initially uploaded and indexed, it is
then assumed to be scanned to verify that it is virus free.
However, in cases in which the clean paper file behind the
indexed link is later replaced by a malicious version, the file
is not rescanned and is now the paper version is available as a
malicious file through these libraries. We suggest applying a
simple check of the hash function behind each indexed file
after it is first uploaded (therefore it is backward check).
By comparing the original hash function to a daily hash
function of each indexed file, a mismatch between the daily
hash of the file and the original version acquired on the
initial upload will serve as an indication that the file should
be further scanned using Anti-Virus to verify that it is virus
free. This idea can also be improved by adding an additional
condition, so that the files for which there is a mismatch
between the abovementioned hash functions, will only be
scanned if the user asks to access this paper, otherwise a
scanning operation will not be performed. On the one hand,
this improvement will significantly reduce the amount of
inspections required, while protecting the users from down-
loading malicious PDF papers. However, on the other hand,
this idea will require an online check when the user wants to
download the file, an operation that will increase the time it
takes for a user to request and receive a desired paper.
In addition, most benign documents don’t usually use
JavaScript, OpenAction or the embedding option of the PDF
format. This is particularly true for academic papers which
don’t have any reason to use these option. Thus, a simple
approach in the case of scholarly digital libraries is to remove
any element that can be used for malicious purposes (includ-
ing JavaScript code, OpenAction commands or embedded
files) from the PDF paper. However, such an approach might
lead to a loss of data and or functionality or cause the file
to become incompatible; thus, rather than changing the file’s
content by removing parts of the file, we prefer detecting
the malicious content of known malware using AV tools and
ML algorithms for unknown malware.
C. NEW PDF MALWARE BACKWARD CHECK
While the vulnerabilities of new PDF documents are iden-
tified from time to time by virus experts, the length of the
discovery period might be quite long. Meanwhile, the new
vulnerability is being used and distributed in additional PDF
documents. If a zero-daymalware contains such new vulnera-
bilities, it will probably evade the widely used anti-virus tools
for some time. Therefore, as new vulnerabilities are discov-
ered and anti-virus tools are updated accordingly, we suggest
a periodic re-check of new vulnerabilities in order to provide a
comprehensive and backward review of a process that could
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easily be automated for all of the files already exist in the
scholarly digital library.
This idea can be improved upon in exactly the samemanner
we suggested in the previous subsection, by adding the con-
dition of conducting this check only if the user asks to access
this paper. The consequences and effects of this will be the
same as was mentioned in the previous subsection, both in
terms of efficiency and time delay.
We now elaborate on each component of the machine
learning based second layer.
D. AN ACTIVE LEARNING BASED DETECTION
METHODOLOGY FOR UNKNOWN MALWARE
DETECTION
Before we present the active learning based detection
methodology, one must first understand the motivation for
active learning in very large databases and repositories.
In addition, since active learning process is strongly related to
the induction of an updated detection model, which is based
on informative features, then we will also cover the features
on which we were based on when we induced the detection
model.
Currently, anti-virus packages are not sufficiently effec-
tive at intercepting malicious PDF documents, even in the
case of highly prominent PDF threats (Tzermias et al. [8]).
According to many studies (surveyed by Nissim et al. [1]),
machine learning methods can effectively distinguish
betweenmalicious and benign PDF documents [1]. Yet, when
applying machine learning based solutions, it is not enough
to create a one-time detection model, since a natural concept
drift process exists ([11], [13]), specifically in the malware
domain [13]. This is due to the fact that benign files and
newly created malware contain new properties and features
that haven’t been seen by the detection model, as well as
existing features with very different values than those the
detection model has been trained on (for instance, these new
features may result from new elements in the file structure).
In addition, the malware domain is very dynamic, since
attackers are continually seeking out new ways of attacking,
new vulnerabilities that can be exploited, and new targets.
These changing parameters affect the file’s structure which
affect the features extracted from the analyzed file, and thus,
significantly reduce the detection capabilities of the detection
models which are not updated and remain outdated. Recent
studies have successfully applied active learning based solu-
tions for efficient malware detection (e.g. [2], [9], [11], [14],
[15], [20], [35]), and concentrated on the updatability process
and enhancement of the detection capabilities of the detection
model, striving to improve efficiency and speed in these areas.
An enhanced and updated detection model will have greater
ability to detect future malware. It is therefore essential to
update the detection model constantly and frequently with
new files (malicious and benign) in order to maintain detec-
tion accuracy over time, especially in large repositories such
as scholarly digital libraries.
Since scholarly digital libraries contain vast amounts of
papers and files to analyze and examine, we suggest con-
ducting static analysis which is fast, lightweight, and analyzes
the general descriptive content in the PDF document, rather
than dynamically analyzing the JavaScript code as many
approaches do. These above mentioned desired elements in
static analysis can be achieved by an approach that utilizes
the meta-features of the content and structure of the PDF
document [3]. The advantage of using meta-features such
as structural paths [3] is that they are not affected by code
obfuscation. The structural path feature extraction method-
ology was shown to be a very effective method to discrim-
inate between malicious and benign PDFs, even for new
and unknown malicious files created two months after the
classification model was created.
Instead of analyzing JavaScript code or any other content,
this approach makes use of essential differences in the struc-
tural properties of malicious and benign PDF documents.
It parses the PDF documents and extracts their structural
paths which are the paths in the file’s hierarchical object
tree that characterize the document’s structure. Each struc-
tural path is analogous to a set of relations between the
objects within the PDF document. For example, the ‘‘. . . /JS’’
path means that the PDF document contains JavaScript
code. The structural paths represent the file’s properties and
actions, therefore they actually represent the file’s genes
rather than a current behavior of the file which can be post-
poned or delayed according to specific conditions.
Note that this structural feature extraction approach has an
additional significant advantage in that it does not directly
rely on any specific attack element or PDF file component
(e.g., it doesn’t depend on the presence of JavaScript as was
proposed by [54] or embedding malicious executables). This
approach identifies the discriminative features based on an
analysis of the entire dataset, between the given classes. This
approach will suggest using the identified features regardless
of the specific attack technique; in this way, the approach will
be able, with our AL advancement, to also identify newer
attack techniques within the malicious PDF files.
Figure 7 provides a simple example of the conversion of a
PDF document into a set of structural paths. The PDF code
is treated as a tree of objects. Note that only the paths of the
leaves in the structural tree are counted.
When an attacker injects malicious content into the PDF
document, the file structure inevitably changes. Thus, this
approach can easily discriminate between benign and mali-
cious files. This approach has several advantages. First, it is
not affected by code obfuscation, filtering, and other encryp-
tion methods used for hiding and concealing malicious code
in the PDF document, since it doesn’t actually analyze the
embedded JavaScript code.
Second, it is robust towards mimicry and reverse mimicry
attacks, since our detection framework implements and is
based on the structural feature extraction methodology pro-
posed in previous work [21]. In an experiment that included
5,000 malicious and 5,000 benign files, the authors of that
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FIGURE 7. Example of the conversion of a PDF document to a set of
structural paths.
study showed that this structural feature extraction method-
ology is resilient to mimicry attacks in 99.975% of the
cases they checked. Since our framework utilizes this fea-
ture extraction methodology and even improves it with an
active learning module that constantly updates the detection
capabilities, our framework would be at least as resilient to
mimicry attacks as the work which presented this method-
ology [21]. Finally, it is very fast and lightweight, since the
analysis is done statically and does not require any execution
of the PDF document. Because of this, analysis is conducted
quite quickly at the rate of 28ms for an average file [21].
Using the PdfFileAnalyzer27 parser we parsed the compatible
PDF documents and extracted all of the unique structural
paths that were found within our dataset. We applied the
information gain feature selection method, and this resulted
in the 100most distinctive and prominent paths. Each of these
paths was used as a feature. Each PDF document was repre-
sented as a vector of Boolean features so that the presence
(1) or absence (0) of a structural path within a PDF document
is represented by 1 or 0 respectively.
There are three main approaches for feature selection:
filter methods,wrapper methods, and embeddedmethods [51]
Filter methods use a metric to evaluate the correlation of each
individual feature to the target class. The information gain
feature selection method [50] is a type of filter method [51]
which assigns a higher score to features that contribute more
to discrimination between the classes. Information gain is
based on entropy calculations. The entropy E(S) character-
izes the disorder of an arbitrary set of instances. The higher
the entropy the greater the disorder. Equation 1 presents
the formula for calculating the entropy of a set of items S
(e.g., feature’s values), based on C subsets of S (e.g., item
classes). The information gain measures the expected reduc-
tion of entropy caused by dividing the examples according
to attribute A, in which V is the set of possible values of A,
27http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/450254/PDF-File-Analyzer-
With-Csharp-Parsing-Classes-Vers
as shown in Equation 2.
E (S) =
∑
cC
−|Sc||S| · log2
|Sc|
|S| (1)
IG (S,A) = E(S)−
∑
vV (A)
|Sv|
|S| · E(Sv) (2)
Table 5 shows the 14 most prominent features of the
100 selected features. Their rank and selection criterion are
also included in the table. It is interesting to note that none
of the 14 prominent features are associated with any of the
elements that are known to be utilized in attacks (e.g., embed-
ding files, JavaScript, etc.); such a fact only points to the
generality of the features, in terms of their ability to distin-
guish between malicious and benign PDF files without con-
sideration of the attack’s technical aspects. This is a great of
importance, since these features will probably also work well
when new vulnerabilities or attacks are utilized or invented.
TABLE 5. The 14 most prominent features as they were ranked and
selected by the information gain method.
Leveraging the abovementioned structural feature extrac-
tion approach [3] using machine learning algorithms will
induce the detection model. After understading the com-
ponents of the induced detection model, on the following
subsection we deeply explain why and howwe suggest apply-
ing our active learning framework [2], [11] for enhancing
the capabilities of the detection model in light of the mass
creation and addition of new PDF documents to the scholarly
digital libraries daily. We now describe the active learning-
based framework.
E. METHODOLOGY FOR IMPROVING DETECTION OF
MALICIOUS PDF DOCUMENTS.
The machine learning based layer of Sec-Lib is depicted
in Figure 8. It can be seen that the methodology deals with the
process of detecting and acquiring new malicious PDF docu-
ments through maintaining the updatability of the anti-virus
and detection model. If the file is informative enough or is
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assessed as likely being malicious, it will be acquired for
manual analysis. As Figure 8 shows, the compatible and
unknown PDF documents are transported from the determin-
istic first layer and scrutinized within the second layer of the
Sec-Lib framework {1}.
FIGURE 8. The process of detecting and maintaining the updatability of
the detection model and anti-virus tool using AL methods.
Then, the prominent and relevant structural paths are
extracted from the remaining PDF documents (which are
compatible and unknown documents), and each of these paths
was used as a feature. Each PDF document is now represented
as a vector of Boolean features, so that the presence (1)
or absence (0) of a structural path within a PDF document
is represented by 1 or 0 respectively. Then the vectors repre-
senting the files are introduced to the detection model which
is based on SVM and AL.
The detection model scrutinizes the PDF documents and
provides two values for each file: a classification decision
using the SVM classification algorithm and a distance calcu-
lation from the separating hyperplane {3}. A file that the AL
method recognizes as informative and has indicated should
be acquired is sent to an expert who manually analyzes and
labels it {4}.
The goal of the manual analysis process carried out by
a human expert for malware detection is to decide whether
the informative file that was selected is malicious or benign,
and accordingly assign a label (malicious or benign) to each
file based on indicators found when the file is analyzed
statically or dynamically (during run-time). In order to better
understand the file’s behavior and the operation the file is
actually performing during its run-time, a comprehensive
dynamic analysis process must be applied. In this process,
the human expert executes the file in an isolated and emulated
computational environment referred to as sandbox [39], [40].
Using sandbox, the security expert is able to trace the file’s
behavior in an environment that is identical to the compu-
tational environment that the file will be opened in by the
users: the people who will really read a given paper and
open the file. Such an environment includes popular operation
systems, the relevant PDF reader version, network commu-
nication, etc. In this way, the security expert can identify
many of the operations taking place during the file’s run-time,
and therefore malicious and dangerous operations associated
with the inspected file can be recognized. Such operations
might include 1) unneeded communication with an unknown
remote server (can be used to exfiltrate sensitive and private
information from the victim’s computer, 2) extensive encryp-
tion operations on the victim’s hard drive (can be a good
indication of a ransomware [41] attack in which the attacker
encrypts the victim’s files and documents, which cannot be
accessed until the victim pays the attacker demanding the
ransom), 3) extensive usage of CPU and memory (can be a
good indication of a cryptojacking attack [42] in which the
attacker utilizes and exhausts the computational resources of
the victim’s computer in order to mine cryptocurrencies28
on behalf of the attacker). On the other hand, running the
informative file in Sandbox, is a secure way to understand
the file’s behavior while preventing any damage or infection
to users’ computers and systems. The main shortcoming of
manual analysis is that the process is not straightforward, and
it requires a human expert as well as computational time and
resources. Therefore, our active learning-based framework
helps us focus the human expert’s efforts and time on the
most informative files only, aiming to obtain as much new
information for the detection model as possible and keeping
it updated given the volume of new malicious files created on
a daily basis.
By acquiring these informative PDF documents, we aim
to frequently update the anti-virus software by focusing the
expert’s efforts on labeling PDF documents that are most
likely to be malware or on benign PDF documents that are
expected to improve the detection model. Note that informa-
tive files are defined as those that when added to the training
set improve the detection model’s predictive capabilities and
enrich the anti-virus signature repository. Accordingly, in our
context, there are two types of files that may be considered
informative. The first type includes files in which the classi-
fier has limited confidence as to their classification (the prob-
ability that they are malicious is very close to the probability
that they may be benign). Acquiring them as labeled exam-
ples will probably improve the model’s detection capabili-
ties. In practical terms, these PDF documents will have new
structural paths or special combinations of existing structural
paths that represent their execution code (inside the binary
code of the executable). Therefore these files will probably
lie inside the SVMmargin and consequently will be acquired
by the SVM-Margin strategy that selects informative files,
both malicious and benign, that are a short distance from the
separating hyperplane.
The second type of informative files includes those that lie
deep inside the malicious side of the SVM margin and are a
maximal distance from the separating hyperplane. These PDF
28https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/01/unit42-large-
scale-monero-cryptocurrency-mining-operation-using-xmrig/
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documents will be acquired by the Exploitation method (to
be explained later) and are also a maximal distance from
the labeled files. These informative files are then added to
the training set {5} for updating and retraining the detection
model {6}. The files that were labeled as malicious are also
added to the anti-virus signature repository in order to enrich
and maintain its updatability {7}. Updating the signature
repository also requires an update to clients utilizing the
anti-virus application. This second layer includes two main
phases: training and detection/updating.
1) TRAINING
A detection model is trained over an initial training set
that includes both malicious and benign PDF documents.
After the model is tested over a stream that consists only
of unknown files that were presented to it in the first trial
(trials can take place every day / week / month), the initial
performance of the detection model is evaluated.
2) DETECTION AND UPDATING
For every unknown PDF document in the stream, the detec-
tion model provides a classification, and the AL method pro-
vides a rank representing how informative the file is, and the
methodology will consider acquiring the files based on this
ranking. After being selected and receiving their true labels
from the expert, the informative PDF documents are acquired
by the training set, and the signature repository is updated
as well, just in case the files are malicious. The detection
model is retrained over the updated and extended training
set which now also includes the acquired examples that are
regarded as being very informative. At the end of the trial,
the updated model receives a new stream of unknown files on
which the updated model is once again tested and from which
the updated model again acquires informative files. Note that
the goal is to acquire as many malicious PDF documents as
possible, since such information will maximally update the
anti-virus tool that protects most organizations as well asWeb
services such as scholarly digital libraries.
We employed the SVM classification algorithm using the
radial basis function (RBF) kernel (gamma = 3) in a super-
vised learning approach. We used the SVM algorithm for
the following reasons: 1) SVM has been successfully used
to detect worms [14], [26], classify malware into species, and
detect zero-day attacks [27], 2) the trained SVM classifier is
a black box that is hard for an attacker to understand [26],
3) SVM has proven to be very efficient when combined with
AL methods [2], [11], [15], [20], and 4) SVM is known for
its ability to handle large numbers of features which makes
it suitable for handling the large number of structural paths
extracted from the PDF documents [16].
Lastly, based on our preliminary experiments, we found
that the SVM classifier with RBF kernel gamma = 3,
outperformed all other classifier, kernels, and parameter
combinations.
In our experiments we used Lib-SVM implementa-
tion [17], in order to classify the PDF files into two classes,
benign and malicious, in a binary classification problem.
We chose Lib-SVM, which supports the multi-class classi-
fication, so that our framework will be able to support future
research and additional detection problems which might be
associated with multiple classes. We integrated our detection
framework within theWeka29machine learning environment.
We chose the RBF kernel due to the fact that a complex
function is required in order to well distinguish between the
malicious and benign classes of PDF documents. Attackers
try to evade detection by inserting benign functionalities in
the malicious PDF documents, or alternatively, try to hide
the malicious elements and functionalities in the malicious
file, thus making the malicious files very similar to the benign
files. This results in data which is hard to classify and affects
the ability of an induced model to discriminate between the
benign and malicious PDF documents. The RBF kernel is
able to find better separations among the complex data, and
thus, is a sophisticated and subtle kernel function suitable for
our use.
F. SELECTIVE SAMPLING AND ACTIVE LEARNING
METHODS
Since our Sec-Lib framework and AL methodology aims
to provide solutions to real problems it must be based on
a sophisticated, fast, and selective high-performance sam-
pling method. We compared our proposed AL methods to
other strategies, and the four methods considered are briefly
described below:
1) RANDOM SELECTION (RANDOM)
While random selection is obviously not an active learning
method, it is at the ‘‘lower bound’’ of the selection methods
discussed. We are unaware of an anti-virus tool that uses
an active learning method for maintaining and improving its
updatability. Consequently, we expect that all AL methods
will perform better than a selection process based on the
random acquisition of files.
2) THE SVM-SIMPLE-MARGIN AL METHOD (SVM-MARGIN)
The SVM-Simple-Margin method [18] (referred to as
SVM-Margin) is directly related to the SVM (support vec-
tor machine) classifier [36], [37]. Using a kernel function,
the SVM implicitly projects the training examples into a
different (usually a higher dimensional) feature space denoted
by F . In this space there is a set of hypotheses that are consis-
tent with the training set, and these hypotheses create a linear
separation of the training set. Among the consistent hypothe-
ses, referred to as the version space (VS), the SVM identifies
the best hypothesis with the maximum margin. To achieve
a situation where the VS contains the most accurate and
consistent hypothesis, the SVM-Margin AL method selects
examples from the pool of unlabeled examples, reducing
the number of hypotheses. This method is based on simple
heuristics that depend on the relationship between the VS and
29https://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/∼ml/weka/
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SVM with the maximum margin. Calculating the VS is com-
plex and impractical where large datasets are concerned, and
therefore, the simple heuristic is used. Examples that lie
closest to the separating hyperplane (see Figure 9 in which
the selected examples from both classes are colored in red
and lie inside the margin) are more likely to be informative
(may improve the classifier’s capabilities) and therefore are
acquired and labeled.
FIGURE 9. The examples (colored in red) that will be selected according
to the SVM-Margin AL method’s criteria.
This method, in contrast to ours, selects examples accord-
ing to their distance from the separating hyperplane, only
to explore and acquire the informative files without relation
to their classified labels, i.e., not specifically focusing on
malware instances. The SVM-Margin AL method is very
fast and can be applied to real problems; yet, as its authors
indicate [18], this agility is achieved, because it is based on a
rough approximation and relies on assumptions that the VS is
fairly symmetric and that the hyperplane’s Normal (W ) is
centrally placed, assumptions that have been shown to fail
significantly [28]. The method may query instances in which
the hyperplane does not intersect the VS, and therefore, may
not be informative. The SVM-Margin method for detecting
instances of PC malware was used by Moskovitch et al. [29]
whose preliminary results found that the method also assisted
in updating the detection model but not the anti-virus applica-
tion itself; however, in this study themethodwas only used for
a one day trial. We compared its performance to our proposed
AL methods for a longer period, in set of experiments which
consider a daily process of detection of PDF documents and
their acquisition, which reflects what happens in reality. This
serves as our baseline AL method, and we expect our method
to improve the new malicious PDF detection and acquisition
seen in SVM-Margin.
3) EXPLOITATION: OUR PROPOSED ACTIVE LEARNING
METHOD
Our method, ‘‘Exploitation’’ [9], is based on SVM classifier
principles and is oriented towards selecting examples most
likely to be malicious that lie furthest from the separating
hyperplane. Thus, our method supports the goal of boosting
the signature repository of the anti-virus software by acquir-
ing as much new malware as possible. For every file X that is
suspected of being malicious, Exploitation rates the distance
from the separating hyperplane using Equation 3 based on
the Normal of the separating hyperplane of the SVM clas-
sifier that serves as the detection model. In fact, Equation
3 calculates the distance between the vector that represents
the inspected file (X) to the separating hyperplane of the
detection model. The separating hyperplane of the SVM is
represented by W (Equation 4). W is the Normal of the
separating hyperplane and is actually a linear combination
of the most important examples Xi (supporting vectors) and
their labels Yi (e.g., malicious or benign), multiplied by
Lagrangemultipliers (α) and the kernel functionK that assists
in achieving linear separation in higher dimensions. Accord-
ingly, the distance in Equation 1 is simply calculated between
example X and the Normal (W).
Dist(X ) =
(
n∑
1
αiyiK (xix)
)
(3)
w =
n∑
1
αiyi8(xi) (4)
In Figure 10, the files that were acquired (markedwith a green
circle) are the files classified as malicious and have the max-
imum distance from the separating hyperplane. Acquiring
several newmalicious files that are very similar to and belong
to the same virus family is considered a waste of manual
analysis resources, since these files will probably be detected
by the same signature. Thus, acquiring one representative
file for this set of new malicious files will serve the goal
of efficiently updating the signature repository. In order to
enhance the signature repository as much as possible, we also
check the similarity between the selected files using the ker-
nel farthest first (KFF) method suggested by Baram et al. [30]
FIGURE 10. The criteria by which Exploitation acquires new unknown
malicious PDF documents. These files lie the farthest from the hyperplane
and are regarded as representative files.
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which enables us to avoid acquiring examples that are quite
similar. Consequently, only the representative files that are
most likely malicious are selected. In cases in which the
representative file is detected as malware as a result of the
manual analysis, all variants that were not acquired will
be detected the moment the anti-virus is updated. In cases
in which these files are not actually variants of the same
malware, they will be acquired the following day (after the
detection model has been updated), as long as they are still
likely to be malware.
In Figure 10 it can be observed that there are sets of
relatively similar files (based on their distance in the kernel
space), however, only the representative files that are most
likely to be malware are acquired. The SVM classifier defines
the class margins using a small set of supporting vectors (i.e.,
PDF documents). While the usual goal is to improve classi-
fication by uncovering (labeling) files from the margin area,
our main goal is to acquire malware in order to update the
anti-virus. Contrary to SVM-Margin which explores exam-
ples that lie inside the SVM margin, Exploitation explores
the malicious side to discover new and unknown malicious
files that are essential for the frequent update of the anti-
virus signature repository, a process which occasionally also
results in the discovery of benign files (files which will
likely become support vectors and update the classifier).
Figure 5 also presents an example of a file lying far inside
the malicious side that was found to be benign. The distance
calculation required for each instance in this method is fast
and equal to the time it takes to classify an instance in a
SVM classifier, thus it is applicable for products working in
real-time.
4) COMBINATION: A COMBINED ACTIVE LEARNING
METHOD
The ‘‘Combination’’ method [2] lies between the SVM-
Margin and Exploitation. On the one hand, the combination
method begins by acquiring examples based on SVM-Margin
criteria in order to acquire the most informative files (acquir-
ing both malicious and benign files), an exploration phase
which is important in order to enable the detection model to
discriminate between malicious and benign PDF documents.
On the other hand, the combination method then tries to
maximally update the signature repository in an exploitation
phase, drawing on the Exploitation method. This means that
in the early acquisition period, during the first part of the day,
SVM-Margin is more dominant compared to Exploitation.
As the day progresses, Exploitation becomes predominant.
However, Combination is also being applied in the course
of the 10-day experiment, and over a period of days,
Combination will perform more Exploitation than SVM-
Margin. This means that on the ith day there is more Exploita-
tion than in the (i-1)th day. We defined and tracked several
configurations over the course of several days. Regarding the
relation between SVM-Margin and Exploitation, we found
that a balanced division performs better than other divisions
(i.e., during the first half of the study, the method will acquire
more files using SVM-Margin, while during the second
half of the study, Exploitation takes the leading role in the
acquisition of files). In short, this method tries to take the
best from both of the previous methods.
V. EVALUATION
A. EXPERIMENTAL DATASET CREATION
In order to Evaluate Sec-Lib’s machine learning based solu-
tions, we created an experimental dataset of a 259,635 com-
patible malicious and benign PDF documents based on the
published papers existing in the CiteSeerX scholarly digital
library. We randomly selected a set of 225,591 benign PDF
documents from all of the papers in the library. The selection
process provided a randomly generated number (between
one and zero to each file), and we simply selected only
files that had a random number below a specific thresh-
old. An additional set of 34,044 malicious PDF documents
was collected, both from the malicious files we found in
CiteSeerX during our first scan, and from various other
sources of malicious files such as VirusTotal’s repository and
the Srndic and Laskov academic repository [3]. It is important
to understand that according to our discovery when scanning
CiteSeerX with VirusTotal, the percentage of malicious PDF
documents found was around 0.3%, however this percentage
can easily and significantly increase, since attackers can
use the approaches we’ve presented to more extensively
contaminate scholarly digital libraries and use them as a
malware distribution platform. In addition, it is reasonable
that additional approaches will be found in order to exploit
digital libraries. In our experiment we wanted to create a
reasonable and potentially high risk situation in which the
percentage of malicious PDF documents in the scholarly
digital library is higher than the percentage we have found
in our scan. Although we used a higher percentage than that
found in our scan, we still used a relatively low percentage of
malicious PDF documents (13.2%), particularly compared to
the average percentage of malicious PDF documents reported
in 10 recent academic studies (38%, as we stated in a previous
study [11]). The benign files were reported to be virus free
by VirusTotal. The dataset was intentionally designed to be
imbalanced in order to reflect the reality in themalware detec-
tion domain. It is not realistic or correct to have a balanced
dataset of malicious and benign files, since in real life 50%
of the content is not malicious; the percentage of malicious
content is far less than that of benign content, and this is one of
the challenges in the malware detection domain that we must
cope with. Therefore, the test set must be based on reality and
contain an imbalanced combination of malicious and benign
files. In our previous study [43], we conducted a compre-
hensive analysis of the optimal combination of malicious and
benign files, in the training set and test set. Note that the mali-
cious files percentages within the test set must be based on
reality. Our finding was that the optimal results and the best
detection model is induced when the same file combination
appears in both the training and test sets. Since the test set is
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defined by reality, which was shown to have a low percentage
of malicious files, we designed the training set similarly.
In addition, this combination does not affect the classifier in
terms of bias and correctness as long as the correct evaluation
measurements are used. Of course, the standard accuracy
measurement is not suitable for evaluating classifiers’ per-
formance which has been tested on an imbalanced dataset;
therefore, more suitable evaluation measurements should be
used, such as the TPR and FPRwhich were used in our exper-
iments. Moreover, many previous malware detection studies
addressing a variety of differentmalware detection challenges
(e.g., malicious executables, Androidmalware, maliciousMS
Office files, computer worms, and ransomware detection)
have used imbalanced datasets (with a small percentage of
malicious files) [3], [14], [15], [41], [43]–[49] that reflect
reality and support the correctness of our approach and the
use of an imbalanced dataset. The goal of our classifier is
to detect malicious files, and we accomplish this by using a
binary classifier that classifies the file as malicious or benign.
Thus, the detection of a malicious file is demonstrated by
classifying a malicious file as malicious, and this detection
rate is measured by the TPR metric; an error in classification
in which a benign file is classified as malicious is measured
by the FPR metric. Since the goal of the paper is to detect
malicious files, we present the results of only the TPR and
FPR. Presenting the results of the TNR and FNR does not
add relevant knowledge about the ability of our framework
to achieve the main goals which are detecting malicious files
and acquiring informative files for further improvement of
the detection model over time.
The malicious set contains several malware families such
as viruses, Trojans, and backdoor attacks. Based on our pre-
liminary experiments, we used only 100 unique structural
paths (features) selected by the known information gain fea-
ture selection method. In our preliminary experiments we
compared the information gain and Fisher score [31] selec-
tion methods and information gain outperformed the latter.
As part of our preliminary experiments, we also evaluated
the performance of the different classifiers as a function of
the number of features used, checking various amounts of
features (50, 100, 150, 200, 300 – through 2000, at increments
of 100 features). We note that the detection rate improves
until 97 features are used; then it remains the same until
200 features are used. After that, the rate slowly decreases.
We decided to select the first 100 features as they provided
the maximal detection rate. The use of 200 features is asso-
ciated with more computational resources (without improved
performance), especially in our case in which the classifier is
frequently updated using the AL methodology Sec-Lib.
Each file was represented as a vector of 100 binary features
(value 1 represents the presence of a structural path in the PDF
document, while 0 represents its absence).
B. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The objective of our main experiment was to evaluate and
compare the performance of our new AL methods to the
existing selection methods, SVM-Margin and Random,
on two tasks:
- Acquiring as many new unknown malicious PDF doc-
uments in scholarly digital libraries on a daily basis,
in order to efficiently enrich the signature repository of
the widely used anti-virus tools.
- Updating the predictive capabilities of the detection
model that serves as the knowledge store of AL meth-
ods and improving its ability to efficiently detect mali-
cious PDF documents, as well as identify the most
informative new malicious PDF documents.
We evaluated the second layer of the framework (the machine
learning based layer) in a simulation of 10 trials (a trial can be
either a day, week, or month, depending on the needs of the
digital library). In our experiments we preferred that the trials
be days, for a total period of 10 days, in order to demonstrate,
as much as possible, the importance and contribution of such
a frequent updating process. We evaluated several acquisition
methods including AL methods and random selection, and
compared the performance of the detection model that was
updated separately by each of the selection methods. In our
acquisition experiments we used 259,635 compatible PDF
documents (225,591 benign, 34,044 malicious) in our repos-
itory and created 10 randomly selected datasets with each
dataset containing 10 subsets of 25,900 files representing
each day’s stream of new PDF documents. The 635 remaining
files were used as the initial training set to induce the initial
model. Note that each day’s stream contained 25,900 PDF
documents.
Note that the combination of malicious and benign files in
each of the 10 subsets of 25,900 files and the initial training
set of 635 files matches the combination of malicious and
benign files in the entire dataset, since they were selected
randomly from the entire dataset; in each case, ∼13% of the
files are malicious (i.e., 34,044 out of 259,635).
First, we induced the initial model by training it over the
635 known PDF documents. We then tested it on the first
day’s stream.
The reason and motivation for using a relatively small
initial dataset was to demonstrate the efficiency of our
machine learning and active learning-based detection frame-
work in the process of improving its detection rates over
time (days/trials). One should note that in reality, having
a good set of labeled files (labeled malicious or benign)
requires the manual inspection of a human expert, a task
which is associated with additional time and resources (as
was explained earlier). Therefore, the motivation is to reduce
the burden of labeling files as much as possible and to use
as small an initial training set as possible. By inducing the
initial detection model from a small randomly selected initial
training set of 635 files that included 13.11% malicious files
(83 malicious files and 570 benign files), our initial detection
model had a relatively high detection rate (74.5% TPR),
which shows that although we used a small training set,
the structural features we extracted from the files enable us
to achieve encouraging detection capabilities. Furthermore,
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by performing the active learning process over a period of
10 days, we demonstrated that the initial detection model
can be significantly improved by sustaining it with a small
amount of well-selected informative files (malicious and
benign). By doing so, we showed how our framework can
contribute to reducing the amount of resources dedicated to
file labeling, from the early stage of creating the initial model
(based on small initial training set) and continuing throughout
the experiment with its constant improvement over time.
Next, from this same stream of unknown PDF documents
(files that the detection model hasn’t seen or trained before),
the selective sampling method selected the most informative
PDF documents according to that method’s criteria. One
should note that when an informative file is selected for
acquisition, the only one who labels it is the human expert
and not any other autonomous system. The labeling process
is critical for an accurate dataset, which is the basis of an
accurate detection model; thus, the labeling process must be
performed carefully and by a human expert (or at least under
human expert supervision). Indeed, as was explained earlier,
the human expert uses a variety of tools and techniques (e.g.,
dynamic analysis, Sandbox, etc.), which help him/her decide
how to label the file. Regardless of the identified label of the
file, this new informative file is acquired and added to the
training set, and the new updated detection model is induced
based on the extended and updated training set.
The labeled files were later acquired by the training set
which was enriched with an additional K new informa-
tive files. When a file was found to be malicious, it was
immediately used to update the signature repository of the
anti-virus, and an update was also distributed to clients of
the anti-virus software; because anti-virus software is the
simplest and most widely used malware detection solution,
and nearly every personal and organizational computer is
protected by anti-virus software, almost everyone can be
considered a client. However, anti-virus software is reliant on
the frequent updates distributed by vendors which enable the
anti-virus software to detect new malicious files that are cre-
ated. Given this reality, our framework is of great importance
and will contribute to accelerating the process of updating
anti-virus software and the protection of anti-virus clients.
The process was repeated over the next nine days. The
performance of the detection model was averaged for 10 runs
over the 10 different datasets that were created. Each selective
sampling method was checked separately on 10 different acts
of file acquisition (each consisting of a different amount of
PDF documents). This means that for each act of acqui-
sition, the methods were restricted to acquiring a number
of files equal to the amounts that followed, denoted as K :
10 files, 100 files, 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000, 5000, 6000,
and 7000).
The steps of the experiment are as follows:
1. Inducing the initial detection model from the initial
available training set; i.e., training set available up
to day d (the initial training set includes 635 PDF
documents).
FIGURE 11. The detection accuracy achieved by each of the classifiers;
SVM outperformed the other classifiers.
2. Evaluating the detection model on the stream of day
(d + 1) to measure its initial performance.
3. Introduction of the stream of day (d+1) to the selective
sampling method, which chooses the X most informa-
tive files according to its criteria and sends them to the
expert for manual analysis and labeling.
4. Acquiring the informative files and adding them to the
training set, as well as using their extracted signature to
update the anti-virus signature repository.
5. Inducing a new and updated detection model from the
updated training set (which contained the previously
acquired files combined with the newly acquired files)
and applying the updated model on the next day’s
stream (d+2).
This process repeats itself on our dataset from the first day
until the tenth day.
VI. RESULTS
Before we delve into the main experiment’s results,
we present our results of a preliminary experiment comparing
the detection accuracy of various classifiers; in this case,
the classifiers’ performance was evaluated utilizing the entire
collection of compatible PDF file that included 293,679 files
(259,635 benign and 34,044 malicious). The classifiers were
evaluated throughout the standard 10-fold cross-validation
process (training on nine folds representing 90% of the data
and testing on the remaining fold representing 10% of the
data; repeating this process 10 times, each time with other
training and test folds; and finally, averaging the 10 differ-
ent repetitions). The results are presented in a new figure
(Figure 11). An addition preliminary subexperiment was per-
formed, in which we compared the three different kernels
(linear, polynomial, and RBF) and different tuning param-
eters of SVM, and we found that SVM with RBF kernel
gamma = 3 slightly outperformed the others.
Note that in previous work on PDF detection based on
meta and structural features [53], Smutz and Stavrou found
that the Random Forest classifier outperformed all other
classifiers, including SVM; their evaluation was based on
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100,000 benign and 5,000 malicious PDF documents. In con-
trast, our preliminary experiment showed that the SVM
classifier outperformed all other classifiers, including the
Random Forest, in detection accuracy. Our results are based
on a larger (almost three times larger) and more up-to-date
PDF collection.
We rigorously evaluated the efficiency and effective-
ness of our AL methodology, comparing four selective
sampling methods: 1) a well-known existing AL method,
SVM-Simple-Margin (SVM-Margin) based on [18]; our pro-
posed methods 2) Exploitation, and 3) Combination; and
4) random selection (Random) as a ‘‘lower bound.’’ Each
method was checked for all 10 acquisition amounts, in which
the results were the mean of 10 different folds. In order to
focus the readers on the most interesting results we depicted
the results of the most representative acquisition amount
of 500 PDF documents which is a reasonable number of files
that can be analyzed and inspected on a daily basis by the
security experts of organizations like a digital library.
We now present the results of the core measure in this
study, the number of new unknown malicious files that were
discovered and finally acquired into the training set and signa-
ture repository of the anti-virus software. As explained above,
each day the AL methodology deals with 25,900 new PDF
documents, consisting of about 3400 new unknownmalicious
PDF documents. Statistically, the more files that are selected
daily, the more malicious files that will be acquired daily.
By using AL methods, we tried to improve the number of
malicious files acquired by means of existing solutions. More
specifically, using our methods (Exploitation and Combina-
tion) we also sought to improve the number of files acquired
by SVM-Margin.
Figure 12 presents the number of malicious PDF docu-
ments obtained by acquiring the 500 files daily, by each of
the four methods during the course of the 10 day experi-
ment. Exploitation and Combination outperformed the other
selection methods. Exploitation was the only method that had
FIGURE 12. The number of malicious PDF documents acquired by the AL
methodology for different methods with acquisition of 500 files daily.
perfect acquisition of all malicious PDF documents from the
first day, while Combination had a decrease in the second day
and then perfect acquisition as well. Both of our AL methods
outperformed all of the othermethods, both SVM-Margin and
Random.
On the first day, the number of new malicious PDF docu-
ments is 83, since the initial detection model was trained on
an initial set of 653 labeled PDF documents that consisted
of 83 malware samples. We decided on 653 files from which
the initial detectionmodel would be induced in order to have a
stable detection model with sufficient detection performance
from the start (74.5% TPR on the first day) that can still be
improved through our active learning-based methodology.
On the tenth day, using Combination and Exploitation,
100% of the acquired files were malicious; using SVM-
Margin, only 3.5% of the acquired files were malicious
(17 files out of 500 which is even less than Random).
This presents a significant improvement of almost 97% in
unknown malware acquisition. Note that on the tenth day,
using Random, only 13.8% of the acquired PDF documents
were malicious (69 files out of 500). This is far less than the
malware acquisition rates achieved by both Combination and
Exploitation. The trend is very clear from the second day:
each day, Combination and Exploitation acquired the maxi-
mal number of malicious files– a finding that demonstrates
the impact of updating and preserving the capabilities of the
detection model in identifying new malware samples and
enriching the signature repository of the anti-virus.Moreover,
the acquired malware samples are expected to also have
higher quality in terms of their contribution to the detection
model and the signature repository, since they are different.
As far as we could tell, the random selection trend was
constant - there was no improvement in acquisition capabil-
ities over the 10 days. While the SVM-Margin AL method
showed a decrease in the number of malware samples
acquired from the fifth day. The SVM-Margin acquires
examples about which the detection model is less confident.
Consequently, they are considered to be more informative
but not necessarily malicious. As was explained previously,
SVM-Margin selects new informative PDF documents inside
the margin of the SVM. Over time and with the improve-
ment of the detection model towards more malicious files,
it seems that the malicious files are less informative (due to
the fact that malware writers frequently try to use upgraded
variants of previous malware samples). Since these new
malware samples might not lie inside the margin, SVM-
Margin may actually be acquiring informative benign, rather
than malicious, files. However, our methods, Combination
and Exploitation, are more oriented toward acquiring the
most informative files and the filesmost likely to bemalicious
by obtaining informative PDF documents from the malicious
side of the SVMmargin. As a result, an increasing number of
newmalware samples are acquired; in addition, if an acquired
benign file lies deep within the malicious side, it is still
informative and can be used for learning purposes and to
improve the next day’s detection capabilities.
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So far we have shown that our AL methods outperformed
the SVM-Margin AL method and the Random method and
improved the capabilities for acquiring new PDF malware
samples and enriching the signature repository of the anti-
virus software. We will now also see the detection capabil-
ities of induced detection models. Figure 13 presents the
TPR levels and their trends in the 10 day course of study.
SVM-Margin outperformed other selection methods in the
TPR measure, while our AL method, Combination, came
close to SVM-Margin (SVM-Margin achieved about 2%
better TPR rates than Combination). However, a single factor
ANOVA statistical test on the TPR for SVM-Margin and
Combination active learning methods, resulted in a statisti-
cally insignificant difference (p= 0.67), suggesting that both
active learning methods, Combination and SVM-Margin,
perform similarly.
FIGURE 13. The AL methodology’s TPR over the 10 days for different
methods with the acquisition of 500 PDF documents daily.
In addition, the performance of the detection model
improves as more files are acquired daily, so that in the tenth
day of the experiment, the results indicate that by only acquir-
ing a small and well-selected set of informative files (1.9%
of the stream), the detection model can achieve TPR levels
(96.9% with SVM-Margin and 94.7% with Combination)
that are quite close to those achieved by acquiring the whole
stream (98.1%) which requires labeling of almost the entire
dataset. Using Sec-Lib and AL methods, we achieved almost
the same TPR levels, while using less than 2% of the total
259,635 PDF documents in our experimental dataset after
10 days of efficient acquisition (our dataset was built so it
will be representative of the entire scholarly digital library).
Note that Exploitation didn’t manage to update the detec-
tion model well, and this may be due to the fact that the mali-
cious files don’t have enough new information to enhance
themethod’s detection capabilities, and indeed a considerable
number of benign files also must be acquired as with the
Combination method. The largest gap between AL meth-
ods (SVM-Margin and Combination) and Random can be
observed on the third day and as it was demonstrated by
a gap of almost 10% of detection rates, which means that
AL methods better identified informative PDF documents
to update the detection model and justify the process, while
Random doesn’t even manage to achieve these rates during
the 10 days, after acquiring a total of 5,000 PDF documents
(500 on each day).
The FPR rates were very low (almost 0%) and were quite
similar among all the selection methods.
Finally, to support the effectiveness of our system, we com-
pared it to widely used anti-virus tools in the task of detecting
malicious PDF files from our collection. For a fair compari-
son, and in order to emphasize the efficacy of our proposed
solution, we didn’t use the SVM detector from our prelim-
inary experiment that was trained on 90% of the data and
achieved a 99% detection rate (Figure 13). Instead we used
the SVM detector that was created through the process of
active learning, which better reflects the reality. This SVM
detector was created and updated along 10th days, acquiring
amount of new PDF files that can still be inspected and
labeled by human experts. Note that after 10 days the induced
classifier was trained on just a small portion of the data (less
than 2% or 5,635 files – 635 files in the initial set+ 500 files
daily over a period of 10 days = 5,635). As can be seen
in Figure 14 where the detection rate of Sec-Lib is compared
to the detection rate of the 20 leading anti-virus tools, Sec-
Lib outperformed all of the others. Sec-Lib’s 96.9% detection
rate was achieved using an efficient active learning process in
which, due to the intelligent selection of the most informative
FIGURE 14. Sec-Lib detection rate compared to the 20 best anti-virus
tools; Sec-Lib outperformed all of them.
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PDF files each day, less than 2% of the data was sent to a
human expert for labeling. This performance demonstrates
Sec-Lib’s ability to update andmaintain themodel’s detection
rate and to reduce labeling efforts, costs, and time.
Around one year after we shared our discoveries and
detection methods with CiteSeerX, we conducted an addi-
tional scan in order to learn whether the malicious files
were removed from CiteSeerX, and whether our security
solutions had any long-term implications on the percentage
of malicious files in CiteSeerX. During our recent scan of
CiteSeerX, we managed to scan 3,874,336 PDF documents
using VirusTotal. The scanning resulted in the identification
of just 1,145 malicious files (representing 0.02% of the total
files) compared to the rate of 0.3% that was observed in
the first scan. This comparison demonstrates a significant
improvement and a reduction of 15 times less malware a year
after discovered in the second scan, after implementing the
Sec-Lib framework in the scholarly digital library. Note that
the malicious PDF documents found in the second scan do
not overlap with those found on the first scan – a finding that
indicates that the malicious files found on the first scan 2015
were completely removed from the CiteSeerX library.
VII. LIMITATIONS AND POSSIBLE ATTACKS ON Sec-Lib
Adding and deleting attacks, two attacks targeting active
learning methods in which attackers contaminate unlabeled
data prior to its sampling by the active learner module,
were presented by Zhao et al. [56]. Their evaluation of the
attacks using an intrusion detection dataset demonstrated that
these attacks affect AL methods’ performance and result in
a dramatic drop in detection accuracy, which was shown
to decrease by up to 34%. In the context of an attack on
Sec-Lib, their attack model could be used to create evasive
and malicious PDF files that can avoid detection, simply by
taking advantage of the manner in which Sec-Lib acquires
informative files. For example, the attacker could influence
the AL process and bias the classifiers by utilizing malware
samples with new structural paths which the classifier would
acquire based on their novelty. Having accomplished this,
the attacker can create an evasive PDF file which is based
on the malware samples but does not include the specific
structural paths, thereby creating an evasive PDF file.
Sec-Lib is resilient to such attacks for two reasons. The
first reason is due to the fact that Sec-Lib’s AL process is not
based on a specific digital library on the Internet, but is rather
sustained bymany libraries containing many files. Given this,
such attacks would need to flood significant portions ofmulti-
ple digital libraries in order to poison the Sec-Lib framework
and bias the classifier. Such flooding by an attacker is both
infeasible and time-consuming, allowing anti-virus services
the time to distribute a patch against it (note that anti-virus
software is part of Sec-Lib’s deterministic layer). The second
reason stems from the fact that our framework tries to select
the most informative PDF files and attempts to enlarge the
signature repository that way, as opposed to choosing files
that are similar to previously acquired files. In the case of the
example described above, Sec-Lib’s AL methods would only
acquire a few representative structural paths (as opposed to a
full set of malicious PDF files with similar structural paths).
Thus, the framework would be resilient to such attacks, and
its detection capabilities would remain unaffected.
However, as was shown byMaiorca et al. [55], the evolving
adversarial learning trend has become popular among attack-
ers, particularly those employing PDF malware, and more
methods aimed at confusing and evading ML based detectors
are being proposed. Thus, we presume that the arms race
between attackers attempting to avoid detection and entities
trying to defend against such attacks will continue for years.
VIII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study revealed the phenomenon of contamination of
scholarly digital libraries by malicious PDF documents and
showed how these libraries can easily be used to launch and
distribute targeted cyber-attacks aimed at a specific group of
researchers, universities, institutions, and countries. As far as
we know, there are no reliable reports of the accurate percent-
age of malicious PDF documents on the Web, and therefore,
we cannot determine whether scholarly digital libraries are
more or less contaminated than the Web itself. Our study
does point to the ease with which large public databases can
become contaminated and the role they can play in the spread
of malware.
In this study, we evaluated more than two million schol-
arly papers in the CiteSeerX library in our first scan of the
database and found it to be contaminated with a surpris-
ingly large number (0.3%-2%) of malicious PDF documents
belonging to a variety of different virus families, 72% of
which exploit vulnerabilities in PDF readers (Figure 3). These
malicious documents were uploaded from 46 countries, cov-
ering most continents. US universities were found to be the
origin of over 55% of the malicious papers in CiteSeerX.
More than 41% of these malicious scholarly papers were
downloaded in the US during the last five years. On aver-
age, each malicious paper was downloaded 167 times over a
period of five years by researchers worldwide. As we have
shown, vulnerabilities exist in scholarly digital libraries, and
an attacker needs only to place a malicious version of a
popular paper on an attractive topic (e.g., cyber security) in
a scholarly digital library to utilize the damage coefficient
we found (167 downloads in five years) and spread damage
around the world or launch a targeted attack aimed at of group
of victims interested in the topics the paper presents. In fact,
we show how existing scholarly digital libraries can easily
be leveraged as a distribution platform for targeted as well as
global attacks.
As a practical means of securing very large databases such
as scholarly digital libraries, we designed and developed
Sec-Lib which is a comprehensive detection framework
aimed at enhancing the detection of malicious PDF docu-
ments. Sec-Lib integrates two security layers. The first layer
is aimed at the detection of known malware and includes
a set of deterministic and rule based detection solutions.
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The second layer, aimed at unknown malware detection,
consists of several advanced machine learning based meth-
ods, such as an SVM classifier trained on structural fea-
tures of PDF documents, as well as active learning methods
for enhancing the detection capabilities over time. Results
showed that Sec-Lib efficiently detected unknown mal-
ware with high TPR levels (96.9% with SVM-Margin and
94.7% with Combination) and almost no false positives,
using only 2% of the dataset for training, thus reducing
the manual inspection efforts of security experts by 98%.
These results have potential economic implications and
demonstrate the efficiency of the Sec-Lib framework in
maintaining and improving the updatability of the detec-
tion model and ultimately, the anti-virus tool. These of
high detection rates achieved through a minimal acqui-
sition of PDF documents for inspection, demonstrate the
benefits obtained by performing this process on a daily
basis. After considering the ideas and methods presented
in the Sec-Lib framework within CiteSeerX scholarly dig-
ital library, we observed a reduction of 15 times less PDF
malware in this library, a finding that demonstrates our
frameworks ability to provide meaningful improvement in
the security of very large databases such as scholarly digital
libraries.
IX. FUTURE WORK
In future work, we suggest evaluating the malicious PDF
presence in additional digital libraries such as MAS, Web
of Science, and PubMed, as well as investigating them for
vulnerabilities. We also suggest investigating the rate of con-
tamination of digital libraries within the Darknet, such as
Libgen, Sci-Hub, and Booksc.
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